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Saturday Morning, February 17
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE-A SUGGESTED
CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEDURES OF REGULATORY
AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF AGRICULTURE
ASHLEY SELLERSt
The title requires both definition and delimitation. The terms
"procedure," "regulatory," and "agencies" do not go unchal-
lenged, especially in these days of symposia and institutes on
administrative law.
For present purposes, the term "procedure" will be given a
restricted meaning and will be used, in a manner especially
familiar to lawyers, to describe the methods and practices relat-
ing to administrative hearings. Someone has called this the "full-
dress" level of administrative procedure. This description, if
applicable to the procedure of any administrative agency, is
hardly descriptive of that of a bureau of the Department of
Agriculture. Tuxedo and black tie, perhaps, but definitely not
tails and topper.
As to the meaning to be given herein to the term "regulatory":
the distinction between the regulatory and non-regulatory work
of the Department is, for the most part, easily apparent. Issu-
ance of crop and weather reports, seed distribution, and soil
research are clearly not regulatory functions. Conversely, pre-
scription of stockyard rates and fixing limitations upon specula-
tive transactions on commodity exchanges are examples of pure
regulation. Some of the activities of the Department, however,
may not be so easily classified. For example, where the Depart-
ment, as under the Sugar Act of 1937,1 makes payments to pro-
ducers on condition that no child labor has been used or that
fair wages have been paid in the process of production, there
t A.B., Princeton University, 1924; LL.B., University of Texas, 1928;
S.J.D., Harvard University, 1933. Professor of Law, University of Georgia
(on leave of absence). Head Attorney, Office of the Solicitor, United States
Department of Agriculture.
1. 50 Stat. 903, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 1100.
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may not be regulatory activity in a strictly legal sense. Yet,
except in degree, such activity frequently is indistinguishable in
effect from a flat prohibition of child labor or regulation of
wages.2 For the purposes of this paper, however, we shall ignore
the contested area and pretend that there is a well established
boundary line between regulatory and non-regulatory activity.
As thus delimited, the regulatory activities of the Department
are conducted under at least forty separate statutes.3 According
to a classification prepared by the Solicitor of the Department,
these statutes are addressed to four principal purposes: (1) to
protect the interests of producers; (2) to protect the interests
of consumers; (3) to protect the public interest by the conser-
vation of natural resources; and (4) to prevent cruelty to ani-
mals. Within the first of these types of statutes is a group of
ten statutes (including the Animal Quarantine Act, the Plant
Quarantine Act, and the Federal Seed Act) devoted primarily
to increasing the quantity and improving the quality of crops
and livestock; a group of eight statutes (including the Grain
Standards Act, the Cotton Standards Act, the United States
Warehouse Act, and the Tobacco Inspection Act) to enable the
farmer, after production, to market his commodities with knowl-
edge of their probable value by making available to him informa-
tion concerning their comparative quality; a group of five stat-
utes (including the Packers and Stockyards Act, the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act, and the Commodity Exchange
Act) to secure honest returns for farm products by regulating
certain middlemen who handle or deal in such products; and a
2. Cf. United States v. Butler (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 70-71.
3. See the list set forth in the appendix, p. 379, infra. Wherever, because
of common usage or statutory designation, one of these statutes may be
referred to by a short or popular title, the popular title is given in the list.
Hereafter in this article, statutory references will employ the popular titles,
wherever possible, and no further citation will be given.
In addition to the official annual reports of the Department, see the fol-
lowing with respect to the history of the regulatory work of the Depart-
ment. Chas. H. Greathouse, Historical Sketch of the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture--Its Objects and Present Organization, Div. of Publi-
cations, Bulletin 3, 2nd Revision, U. S. D. A., G. P. 0., 1907; Francis G.
Caffey, A Brief Statutory History of the United States Department of
Agriculture, Sol. [Misc.], G. P. 0., 1916; Marshall, The Office of Solicitorfor U. S. Department of Agricudture (1932) 3 Mo. B. J. 55; Eisenhower
and Chew, The United States Department of Agriculture-Its Structurefind Functions, Misc. Pub. No. 88, G. P. 0., 1934; Sherman, The Legal
Basis of the Marketing Work of the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (1937) 11 Agric. Hist. 289.
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group of four statutes (including the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, the Sugar Act of 1937, and the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1938) to establish and maintain fair
prices by providing for the orderly marketing of agricultural
commodities.
The second type of legislation -mentioned above consists of ten
statutes (including the Tea Act, the Meat Inspection Act, and
the recently enacted Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act). The
third type contains the Forest Service laws and those provisions
of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act relating to regulation
of the use and occupancy of sub-marginal land acquired by or
transferred to the Secretary of Agriculture for land conservation
and utilization purposes. The fourth type includes the 28-Hour
Law and the Act of March 3, 1891, authorizing the Secretary to
examine all vessels which carry livestock from the ports of the
United States and to prescribe rules and regulations regarding
accommodations to be provided for such animals.
Principal charge of the administration of the regulatory work
of the Department has been given to ten different "agencies" or
bureaus: the Agricultural Marketing Service, the Bureau of Ani-
mal Industry, the Bureau of Dairy Industry, the Commodity Ex-
change Administration, the Bureau of Entomology and Plant
Quarantine, the Food and Drug Administration, the Forest Ser-
vice, the Division of Marketing and Marketing Agreements, the
Soil Conservation Service, and the Sugar Division. Each of these
bureaus, however, must and does depend upon other units in the
organization of the Department. The research and planning ser-
vices of such agencies as the Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
the Bureau of Agricultural Chemistry and Engineering, and the
Bureau of Home Economics must be relied upon by the regulatory
agencies, especially in connection with the fixing of standards and
the formulation of regulations of general economic content re-
quiring coordination with broad agricultural programs. The
Office of the Solicitor is charged by statute with the supervision
and direction of the "legal work" of the Department and is par-
ticularly active with respect to the legal aspects of regulatory
matters. Finally, all of the work of the Department, except that
which may be redelegated to departmental subordinates, must
pass over the desk of the Secretary or of his two sub-cabinet
assistants, the Undersecretary and the Assistant Secretary. Be-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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cause of the highly discretionary nature of much of the regula-
tory duties devolved upon the Secretary, relatively little of this
type of responsibility has been shifted to the shoulders of others.4
Preliminary account should also be taken of the fact that there
is no single or uniform procedure prevailing in the Department
of Agriculture. It is difficult to discover even one typical pro-
cedure. Rules of administrative practice necessarily differ in
content according to the variations in the true nature of the
proceedings they are devised to govern. This is true of the pro-
cedures in the Department of Agriculture as in administrative
agencies generally. But it is also true that in some instances the
different procedures which have been established in the Depart-
ment have not been very carefully attuned to the character of the
proceedings for which they were designed. To some extent,
therefore, there is a greater variety of procedures than is neces-
sary. This condition, once it has developed, may not be easily
corrected. Its alleviation may be accomplished only through the
4. The constant expansion of the regulatory responsibilities of the De-
partment over the years has increased the general burden upon the persons
of the Secretary, the Undersecretary and the Assistant Secretary, particu-
larly by reason of the increasing number of hearings which the Department
is required to conduct. Since, on the one hand, the delegated duty or power
to make determinations or decisions giving rise to the issuance of adminis-
trative regulatory orders presumably may not be redelegated without specific
statutory authorization, and because, on the other hand, the Supreme Court,
in the Morgan case (1936) 298 U. S. 468, 481, has declared that the "one
who decides must hear," the attention and time of the Secretary and of his
two sub-cabinet assistants have been given to regulatory matters frequently
at an undue sacrifice of other phases of the Department's activities. To
alleviate this situation, the Secretary, early in 1939, requested the Congress
to enact legislation which would enable the Secretary upon occasion to
redelegate to other officials and employees of the Department the authority
to issue regulatory orders having the force and effect of law but issuable
only after notice and opportunity for hearing have been allowed to the
parties affected. Neither of the respective Congressional Committees on
Agriculture to which the matter was referred would countenance such a
broad redelegation of authority, although each committee has approved in
principle the proposal of the Department. A bill introduced by Senator
Schwellenbach (Senate 1955) proposes to create the position of Second
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and to permit the Secretary to redele-
gate such authority to the occupant of the new position. This bill passed
the Senate in the first session of the present Congress and, as amended
in the House committee, is now pending the action of the House. The
House amendment would permit the redelegation to one or two officials to
be selected by the Secretary, rather than to a new sub-cabinet officer.
Should the proposed legislation, in either form, become law, the current
burden upon the persons of the Secretary and his present sub-cabinet
assistants would be greatly alleviated, although undoubtedly it would be
desirable, from an administrative standpoint, to obtain legislative sanction
for a considerably broader power of redelegation.
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tedious process of reexamining the statutes, including their legis-
lative histories, and, after isolating each provision calling for or
requiring an administrative hearing, analyzing the hearing con-
templated thereby in the light of some rational formula or classi-
fication calculated to result in such measure of standardization
and uniformity as is consistent with the demands of realistic
administration. As will presently appear, such a project has been
undertaken at the instance of the Solicitor of the Department
and substantial progress has been made.5 Until this project has
been fully completed and the procedure revised to conform to
the conclusions flowing from the research, it would be premature
to undertake, on a comprehensive scale, any decisive steps to-
ward standardization of the Department's procedures.
However, of the various proceedings which thus far have been
examined in pursuit of the Solicitor's project, certain tentative
classifications and differentiations have been made, to which con-
sideration will now be given.6 The proceedings to be discussed
arise under the following statutes, which perhaps may be termed
the five statutes of the Department of greatest interest to stu-
dents of administrative law: the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ment Act of 1937, the Commodity Exchange Act, the Federal
5. For an official account of the Solicitor's project and its progress to
July 1, 1939, see United States Department of Agriculture, Report of the
Solicitor (1939) 3-7. A considerable portion of the results of the research
made in pursuit of the Solicitor's project has been set forth in a series
of mimeographed monographs which have been given a limited circulation
among some of the more outstanding students and practitioners of Federal
administrative law for the purpose of eliciting criticism which would be
helpful in the formulation of the ultimate conclusions and recommendations
growing out of the project. Thus far the following monographs have been
completed and so circulated. Sellers, Administrative Procedure and Prac-
tice in the Department of Agriculture under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937; Sellers, Administrative Procedure and Practice in
the Department of Agriculture under the Packers and Stockyards Act,
1921; Sellers, Administrative Procedure and Practice in the Department
of Agriculture under the Commodity Exchange Act; and Sellers and Good-
rich, Administrative Procedure and Practice in the Department of Agricul-
ture under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 1930. It should
be stated that these studies are as yet of a preliminary nature, and the
Department has taken no final or official action regarding them.
6. In large measure, the substance of this article is a summary of the
findings made and conclusions drawn from the studies described in note 5,
supra. Because of this fact, the present discussion necessarily will be quite
general in nature. Some of the observations made and conclusions drawn
herein, because of limitations of space, will doubtless appear to have been
too sketchily set forth. They should be criticized, however, only after ex-
amination of the source material upon which they are based, and which is
contained largely in the monographs described in note 5, supra.
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Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the Packers and Stockyards Act,
and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.7 The first
three of these statutes are administered primarily by the Divi-
sion of Marketing and Marketing Agreements, the Commodity
Exchange Administration, and the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, respectively, and the last two by the Agricultural Marketing
Service.
With the exception of one or two proceedings which do not
lend themselves to classification, all of the proceedings contem-
plated by or conducted under these five statutes may be regarded
for procedural purposes as falling within four separate groups,
(A), (B), (C), and (D). Groups (A) and (B) each embraces
rule-making or quasi-legislative proceedings, but are distinguish-
able the one from the other according to whether the rules or
regulations must be based upon evidence taken in the course of
a public hearing. Thus, the proceeding under section 5a (4) of
the Commodity Exchange Act, empowering the Secretary, "after
due notice and opportunity for hearing," to fix a period for de-
livery in settlement of futures contracts, but not requiring a
record to be taken of the hearing, is placed in group (A) ; and
the proceeding under section 701 (e) of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, requiring the Secretary, before he may issue,
amend, or repeal any regulation establishing, inter alia, defini-
tions and standards of identity and standards of quality and fill
of container for food, to hold a public hearing and enter an
order, "based solely on substantial evidence of record at the hear-
ing," falls within group (B). Groups (C) and (D) each includes
adjudicative proceedings, but are distinguishable the one from
the other according to whether the Department participates
therein as an advocate. This distinction may be made both be-
tween different kinds of adjudicative proceedings and between
adjudicative proceedings of the same kind, depending upon
whether the Department assumes an active responsibility for
7. These statutes were selected for study not only because of the inter-
est in their subject-matter, but also because they were determined to be
most nearly typical, insofar as administrative procedure is concerned, of
the numerous regulatory statutes assigned to the Department for enforce-
ment. It was thought that comprehensive studies of the administrative
process as it occurred in the Department under the selected statutes would
be adequate, when supplemented by less detailed studies of the other acts,
to afford a basis for suggesting a greater measure of uniformity in the
Department's procedures.
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the development of the evidence for the Government. For exam-
ple, under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act there
are two types of adjudicative proceedings: (1) upon a complaint
filed with the Secretary by a private person seeking damages by
way of reparation for loss sustained by a violation of the statute
by a commission merchant, dealer, or broker; and (2) upon an
order issued by the Secretary to an alleged violator of the statute
commanding the latter to show cause why he should not be re-
fused a license or why his license should not be suspended or
revoked. Again, the proceeding to determine whether to suspend
or revoke a license, although normally instituted by the Depart-
ment, may sometimes be instituted by and proceed upon the
complaint of a private person; and the Department may or
may not take an active part in the development of the evidence.
Proceedings in which the Department actively participates as
advocate as well as adjudicator may be placed in group (C) ;
those in which it participates in an adjudicatory capacity only,
in group (D). Without pausing just here to argue for or against
the propriety of the above classification of the proceedings, and
using the classification primarily as a convenient mode of ap-
proach to a discussion of the different procedures to be examined
here, we may now endeavor to describe some features of the pro-
cedures of regulatory agencies in the Department of Agriculture.
Group (A): Rule-making proceedings in which the rules or
regulations need not be based solely upon
evidence taken at a hearing
Under each of the five statutes named above, the Secretary of
Agriculture is expressly empowered to make such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to effectuate the provisions of
the statute. In addition, he is specifically directed to exercise
rule-making authority in a number of special instances. These
statutes do not specify what procedure shall attend the formula-
tion of general rules and regulations.8 Nor has Congress pre-
scribed the procedure to govern the making of special rules and
8. In this connection, compare the recently enacted Federal Seed Act
(1939) 53 Stat. 1285, c. 615, sec. 402, (1939 Supp.) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 1592,
requiring that, prior to the promulgation of any rule or regulation under
the Act, a public hearing shall be held. This seems to be the only instance
in which the Department is required by statute to hold a hearing in con-
mection with general as well as special rules and regulations.
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regulations except in a few instances where the statutes specif-
ically provide for notice and hearing. Except in two instances,
to be discussed under the next section of this article, the statutes
do not require that the rules or regulations be based only upon
evidence taken and placed of record at an administrative hearing.
The varieties of procedure controlling administrative rule-mak-
ing long have been suggested, but, until recently, they have re-
mained largely unclassified. For the most part, past study has
been directed to an evaluation of adjudicatory procedures, and
rule-making procedures have gone relatively unnoticed. Recent
legal research 9 and analysis, however, have demonstrated that,
of the several modes of procedure commonly in operation in con-
nection with administrative rule-making, the device of the more
or less formal "hearing" is the least employed and is, perhaps,
the least appropriate. Normally, the information prerequisite to
the formulation of rules and regulations is more expeditiously
and adequately obtained through scientifically conducted investi-
gations by trained departmental administrators and experts, and
through the media of informal conferences and consultations by
such experts with informed members of the interested trade or
public and with others experienced and acquainted with the sub-
ject matter to which the proposed rule or regulation is to be
addressed. Where "hearings" are held, they generally serve a
useful purpose only where the trade or industry is so organized
and its activities so standardized that its practical problems and
the operation of the contemplated rules and regulations may,
comprehensively and severally, be developed by and ascertained
from the testimony of only a small number of its members. Other-
wise the record made at the hearing will not be comprehensive
enough to cover the entire range of the proposed rules and regu-
lations; will tend to be comprised largely of unnecessary dupli-
cations and repetitions; will tend unduly to reflect the individual
or personal viewpoint of the witnesses; will, in many cases, be
cluttered up with procedural and legalistic objections and argu-
ments; and will tend, in general, to consume substantially more
time, labor, and expense than would adherence to less formal
procedures.
In the promulgation of rules and regulations pertaining to the
9. See Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making (1938) 52 Harv.
L. Rev. 259, and the authorities therein cited.
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five statutes under discussion, the Department, in instances where
public hearings were not required by expressions in the statute
to be held as part of the rule-making process, has been guided
largely by the above considerations. The procedure followed in
the formulation of rules and regulations under the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act is fairly typical. The original
regulations issued under that statute were prepared in tentative
draft by the two or three officials of the Department to whom
had been given the initial responsibility for the administration
of the statute. The draft was submitted to and discussed with
the chief of the bureauo and with representatives of the Office
of the Solicitor. Subsequently, extended conferences were held
with representatives chosen by the three principal trade associa-
tions in the fresh fruit and fresh vegetable industries. No public
hearings were held, although, before the issuance of the regula-
tions, opportunity was given to individual members of the trade
to express their views through the medium of meetings or in-
formal conferences scheduled for various cities throughout the
country. The then assistant chief of the bureau undertook to
conduct the conferences and appeared at the places and times
announced for the purpose. Presumably for the reason that the
regulations, as proposed, had been so carefully and sensibly
drafted as to be reasonably adapted to the practical problems
of the trade, no persons appeared to be heard; and the regula-
tions were promulgated without further change.
Where, however, the statute, as does the Commodity Exchange
Act, specifically provides that interested persons shall be given
an opportunity to be heard upon certain proposed regulations,
the statutory requirements must be met; and, as a consequence,
a different rule-making procedure obtains. While this statute
requires public hearings to be held prior to the promulgation of
regulations in only one or two special instances, the Commodity
Exchange Administration held public hearings prior to the pro-
mulgation of general rules and regulations as well. Furthermore,
the rule-making hearings held under the statute, while by no
means attended by such formalism as prevailed in the hearings
10. From the time of its enactment in 1930 until July 7, 1939, the Perish-
able Agricultural Commodities Act was administered by the Bureau of
Agricultural Economics. Since the latter date, the Act has been adminis-
tered by the newly created Agricultural Marketing Service.
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held preliminary to the exercise of administrative adjudicative
authority, are accompanied by considerably more formality than
were the round table conferences or meetings held under the
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act as noted above. The
witnesses in rule-making hearings required under the Commodity
Exchange Act are not under oath; cross-examination is not per-
mitted; there are no "parties" to the proceeding; there is no
rule as to burden of proof nor any necessary order of presenta-
tion of evidence; and argument, either oral or on brief, is not
allowed. But the testimony is stenographically reported, and
opportunity is afforded for the filing of written statements sup-
plemental to or in lieu of oral testimony. The transcript of the
testimony, together with the written statements filed, is digested
and analyzed by officials of the Commodity Exchange Adminis-
tration and by the attorney from the Office of the Solicitor who
has appeared in the hearing." Findings usually are prepared,
and are set forth in the form of proposed regulations, which
eventually are submitted to the Secretary for approval and sig-
11. While the statute does not expressly restrict the Secretary to action
based solely upon the evidence appearing in the administrative record, he
has, in the past, sometimes considered himself so restricted. This interpre-
tation was based upon the two-fold view (1) that the statutory requirement
that hearings be held prior to the issuance of regulations indicates, in and
of itself, a Congressional intent that the regulations are to be based solely
upon evidence taken at the hearings, and (2) that the requirement in one
or two Supreme Court decisions (Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan (1935) 293
U. S. 388; Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935) 295 U. S. 495)
to the effect that executive or administrative regulations, in order to avoid
attack on the ground of unwarranted delegation of legislative authority,
must recite or be accompanied by findings of fact, likewise compels the
regulations to be based upon evidence in the record. Each of these views
is open to question. To attribute to the statutory requirement of a "hear-
ing" or "opportunity for a hearing"--no further specification of procedure
appearing-a legislative intention that a formal record must be taken and
an effect given to it equivalent to that given in an adjudicative proceeding
is to beg the whole unsettled question of the procedural requisites of rule-
making hearings. As to the second view, to ascribe to the requirement
that "findings" accompany administrative regulations, the construction that
there must be evidence taken and a transcript made is to apply a categori-
cal conclusion upon a point of procedure upon which no definite judicial
pronouncement has yet been made. See Landis, Administrative Policies and
the Courts (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 519, 533-544; Fuchs, Concepts and Policies
in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 538,
550, n. 46. It is also interesting to note that the sponsors of the Logan-
Walter Bill now pending in Congress expressly disavow that any such
effect is intended to attach to the rule-making procedure under that pro-
posed legislation. See Sellers, Administrative Law-The Extent to Which
S. 915 or H. R. 4236 Would Affect the Work of the Department of Agri-
culture (1939) 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 819, 828.
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nature. In at least one instance the proposed findings and regu-
lations were made available to all the persons who attended the
hearing and an opportunity was given them to file exceptions. 2
Comparing the one procedure just described with the other, one
cannot fail to be impressed with the procedural differences occa-
sioned by the simple statutory requirement that the Department
shall make rules and regulations only "after notice and an op-
portunity to be heard."
Group (B) : Rule-making proceedings in which the- rules or
regulations must be based upon evidence taken at a hearing
The two proceedings of this character conducted by the De-
partment under the five statutes under discussion are (1) those
arising under section 701 (e) of the recently enacted Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and (2) those under the Agri-
cultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 incident to the issu-
ance of marketing orders.13
In addition to the Secretary's authority to make general rules
and regulations under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, he is empowered to issue regulations covering a wide variety
of special subjects. 1'4 For some obscure reason, the statute singles
12. On June 13, 1938, the Commodity Exchange Commission (an agency
composed of the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and
the Attorney General, which shares with the Secretary of Agriculture the
task of administering the Commodity Exchange Act), after a hearing to
formulate regulations under section 4a of the statute, issued and published
in the Federal Register [ (1938) 3 Fed. Reg. 1408] a notice of the pro-
posed order containing the regulations, announcing that any interested
party would be permitted to file exceptions to the proposed order and that
the Commission, before issuing a final order, would give due consideration
to any exceptions filed. This procedural step was undoubtedly influenced
by possible implications of the second opinion in the Morgan case (1938)
304 U. S. 1, which had been announced less than two months previously
on April 25. Now that sufficient time has elapsed to obtain a more thor-
ough understanding of the opinions of the Court in the Morgan case, it
is obvious that that decision has no application to rule-making proceedings
of the type under present consideration. The fact that, in the proceeding
under section 4a, a period of nearly six months elapsed between the time
of publication of notice of the proposed order and the issuance of the final
order is indicative of the delay which such procedure may entail.
13. Section 8c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act (1933) 48 Stat. 31,
as re-enacted and amended by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 601 et seq.
14. Regulations under this statute may be placed into four classes: (1)
regulations subject to the procedural provisions of subsections 701 (e) and
(f); (2) regulations providing exemptions from statutory requirements;
(3) procedural regulations; and (4) regulations to govern inspection ser-
vice under the "sea food amendment." Public hearings are required in con-
nection with the formulation of only the first of these classes of regula-
tions.
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out a number of the provisions contemplating special regulations
and, as to such regulations only, requires the Department to hold
hearings prior to their promulgation. Typical regulations sub-
ject to such procedure are those establishing definitions, stand-
ards of identity, and standards of quality and fill of container
for foods.15 The statute does not stop with the simple require-
ment of notice and hearing, however, but, in addition to making
several other procedural requirements not usually found in con-
nection with a grant of administrative rule-making authority,
provides that the Secretary "shall base his order only on sub-
stantial evidence of record at the hearing and shall set forth
as part of the order detailed findings of fact on which the order
is based." Special provision is made for an appeal to an appro-
priate circuit court of appeals, where the order may be reviewed
upon the administrative record, but where the findings of the
Secretary are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.10
15. At several places in the succeeding portion of this paper, reference
is made to food standards hearings. It should be remembered that the
observations as to administrative procedure made in connection with such
references are equally applicable to all of the proceedings contemplated
by section 701 (e) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
As of January, 1940, all of the hearings held under section 701 (e) of
the Act have related to regulations proposed: (1) under section 401, pro-
viding for establishment of standards of identity and standards of quality
and fill of container for food; and (2) under sections 406 (b), 504, 604,
and 706, providing for the listing of harmless coal-tar colors suitable for
use in food, drugs, and cosmetics, the certification of batches of such colors,
and the payment of fees for such service. The hearings held on proposals
under section 401 include the following foods: tomato puree, tomato paste,
tomato catsup, tomato juice, canned tomatoes, eggs, liquid whole eggs,
liquid mixed eggs, frozen whole eggs, dried whole eggs, egg yolk, frozen
egg yolk, dried egg yolk, canned peaches, canned apricots, canned pears,
canned cherries, canned peas, canned vegetables, cream, whipping cream,
evaporated milk, sweetened condensed milk, dried skim milk, fruit preserves,jelly and butter foods, cheddar cheese, washed curd cheese, Colby cheese, and
cream cheese.
16. The special statutory appeal, however, is not the sole method by
which a court review of administrative regulations may be obtained. The
statute expressly states that "the remedies provided for in this subsection
[701(f)] shall be in addition to and not in substitution for any other
remedies provided by law." Thus, it appears that a regulation may be
challenged in any court which may be called upon to adjudicate an alleged
violation of the regulation, whether in an enforcement proceeding or in a
proceeding to enjoin enforcement. It is not altogether clear whether, in
such an instance, the court would restrict its review to an examination of
the administrative record, or whether the court proceeding would be at
least partially de novo. In this connection, it should be noted that sub-
section 701 (g) provides that a certified copy of the administrative record
"shall be admissible" in any judicial proceeding arising under the Act,
irrespective of whether a special statutory appeal under subsection 701 (f)
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Included with the rule-making powers of the Secretary under
the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 is his author-
ity to issue so-called "orders" regulating the interstate or foreign
commerce handling of certain agricultural commodities or prod-
ucts. In one form or another, orders authorized by the statute
control the volume of interstate business which may be trans-
acted by handlers; prescribe a mode of distribution of commodity
surplus; prohibit unfair methods of competition and unfair trade
practices among handlers; and, with reference solely to the han-
has "previously been instituted or become final * * *." The argument has
been made that, by providing that the record be "admissible," Congress
intended that other evidence as well might be entertained by the court.
Such an interpretation of the Act does not seem tenable, however, in view
of (1) the provisions in sections 701 (f) and 505 that, in cases where
the court deems additional evidence appropriate, it is to order such evi-
dence taken at a hearing before the Secretary; and (2) the rules requiring
exclusive preliminary resort to administrative agencies and making the
exhaustion of the administrative remedies prerequisite to judicial proceed-
ings with reference to any claim for relief. As to (1), both the new drugs
provisions and the special statutory review of regulations section of the
Act require that any additional evidence deemed appropriate by a court
that is called upon to review the administrative action of the Secretary
shall be taken, if at all, at a hearing before the Secretary. These express
provisions would seem to exclude the idea of implying that a court has the
power to take new or additional evidence in any proceeding challenging the
Secretary's administrative action under the statute. As to the primaryjurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies rules, both of which
are so intimately connected as to be called sometimes by one name and
sometimes by the other, it seems clear that no person would be allowed to
offer evidence bearing upon the reasonableness of an administrative regu-
lation in any judicial proceeding without having first offered to present the
evidence before the Secretary of Agriculture. See, on the primary juris-
diction rule, Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co. (1922) 259
U. S. 285, 291; Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907) 204
U. S. 426; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. United States ex rel. Pitcairn Coal
Co. (1910) 215 U. S. 481; Woodrich v. Northern Pacific Ry. (C. C. A. 8,
1934) 71 F. (2d) 732, 97 A. L. R. 401; and Red "C" Oil Manufacturing
Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North Carolina (1912) 222 U. S. 380. On
the exhaustion of administrative remedy rule, see P. F. Petersen Baking
Co. v. Bryan (1934) 290 U. S. 570; Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin(1934) 293 U. S. 163; Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery (1937) 302
U. S. 300; Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals (1926) 270
U. S. 117. In general, see 2 Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (1931) 393, et seq., especially 403-404; Comment, Primary Jurisdiction
-Effect of Administrative Remedies on the Jurisdiction of Courts (1938)
51 Harv. L. Rev. 1251; and Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Reme-
dies (1939) 48 Yale L. J. 981. It may not be disputed that the adminis-
trative rule-making contemplated by section 701 (e) requires expertness
and specialized skill to such an extent as to render the primary jurisdiction
doctrine applicable. Further, it seems that, in view of the Secretary's power
to amend or repeal any such regulation either upon his own initiative or
upon the proper application of any interested industry or substantial por-
tion thereof, there is an available administrative remedy which must be
exhausted before judicial proceedings are attempted.
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dling of milk, price-fixing is provided. The Secretary may issue
a marketing order only after notice and opportunity for hearing
have been provided, and shall issue the order "if he finds, and
sets forth in such order, upon the evidence introduced at such
hearing," among other findings, that the issuance of the order
will tend to effectuate the declared policy of the statute with
respect to the commodity involved. Except for provisions per-
mitting the United States to collect forfeitures in civil suits
against persons who wilfully exceed any quota or allotment fixed
under the Act, and provisions conferring jurisdiction upon the
federal district courts specifically to enforce and to prevent and
restrain any person from violating any order, regulation or
agreement issued or made under the statute, there is no special
provision for obtaining judicial review of a marketing order.
However, it appears likely that judicial review could be obtained,
but that the courts, regardless of the method by which the order
is challenged, would restrict the scope of their review to a scru-
tiny of the administrative record and would sustain the order if
based upon substantial evidence in such record.17 It is quite prob-
able, therefore, that the requirements of law, whether in the form
of statutory provisions or of judicial pronouncements, pertain-
ing to the procedure to govern the two proceedings under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, are virtually identical.
17. Presumably, the courts will apply the same formula of review with
respect to challenged marketing orders as they apply to challenged rate
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, as to which also the statute
is silent respecting the conclusiveness of the administrative findings. In
reviewing rate orders, the courts have consistently sustained the findings
of the Commission if supported by substantial evidence. Tollefson, Judicial
Review of the Decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1936) 5
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 503. The same formula has been applied in reviewing
orders of other agencies, despite variations as to the scope of the review
in the language of the various statutes. See, for example, the following
cases where the judicial approach seems to be the same, regardless of
statutory formulae. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations
Board (1938) 305 U. S. 197 and Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach
Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (1937) 301 U. S. 142, arising under
the National Labor Relations Act; Saginaw Broadcasting Company v. Fed-
eral Communications Comm. (App. D. C. 1938) 96 F. (2d) 554, 563, cert.
den. (1938) 305 U. S. 613, arising under the Communications Act of 1934;
and Federal Trade Comm. v. Algoma Lumber Co. (1934) 291 U. S. 67;
with which compare Federal Trade Comm. v. Curtis Publishing Co. (1923)
260 U. S. 568; Electro Thermal Co. v. Federal Trade Comm. (C. C. A. 9,
1937) 91 F. (2d) 477, cert. den. (1937) 302 U. S. 748; and the dictum in
Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Comm. (C. C. A.
8, 1922) 280 Fed. 45, 48, all arising under the Federal Trade Commission
Act.
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A comparison of the actual procedures governing these two
proceedings reveals that, up through the stage of the taking of
the testimony before the presiding officer, the procedures are
quite similar. In each case the proposal upon the basis of which
the hearing was held has been formulated by a long process of
intra-departmental research and of informal consultation with
representative members of the affected trade or industry, and the
proposal has been reduced to a quite specific form. The notice of
the hearing has been published in the Federal Register and copies
sent to a large number of persons known to be interested in the
proceeding. The notice in each instance contained either the full
text of the proposal or a summary thereof. 18
The atmosphere of each of the hearings is alike, although they
differ somewhat by virtue of the fact that the food standards
hearings thus far have always been held in Washington, while
most of the marketing order hearings have been held in the area
to be affected by the order. Each has a large number of partici-
pants representing different trade groups and interests. The
Department itself is represented not only by the bureau which
has usually made the proposal but sometimes by other agencies
as well, notably the Consumers' Counsel; and there are frequently
differing points of view advanced by the different departmental
representatives.
The two hearings are alike also as to the order of introduction
or reception of testimony, although the rules of practice obtain-
ing in hearings upon proposed marketing orders seem to give
less discretion to the presiding officer in this respect.19 The rules
of evidence in each case are equally liberal, although, because in
the food standards hearings the privilege of cross-examination is
more freely allowed and employed, the evidence in the records
of such hearings is more closely developed. In neither instance
is oral argument permitted at any stage of the proceeding, but in
both cases written arguments or briefs are freely received.
18. In food standards proceedings, the full text of the proposal is set
forth in the notice-for an example, see (1939) 4 Fed. Reg. 3585; in market-
ing order proceedings, the notice contains merely a summary of the terms
of the proposal, but advises that true copies will be furnished to any inter-
ested person upon request-see (1939) 4 Fed. Reg. 4465. The statute
specifically requires, as to food standards proceedings, that "the notice shall
set forth the proposal in general terms * * * 21
19. United States Department of Agriculture, General Regulations-
A. A. A. Series A, No. 1, sec. 207.
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Upon the conclusion of the taking of testimony, however, real
differences in the two procedures commence. In a proceeding
upon a proposed marketing order, the persons to be affected by
the order are allowed no further participation in its formulation.
The representatives of the Department who participated both in
the formulation of the initial proposal and in the public hearing
proceed immediately to the preparation of the final order, making
such modifications of or additions to the initial proposal as the
evidence adduced at the hearing requires. The final draft of the
order, together with a memorandum prepared by the draftsmen
of the order explaining its provisions and a transcript of the
administrative record, is then submitted to the Secretary for his
consideration and signature. At no time throughout the entire
proceeding upon a proposed marketing order, either during the
hearing or afterwards, is there an attempt made to isolate the
presiding officer from the departmental employees who partici-
pate in the hearing, or to preclude the latter from participating
freely in the post-hearing procedures involved in the preparation
and promulgation of the final order.
With the close of the testimony in a food standards proceed-
ing, on the other hand, the persons to be affected by the order
continue their active participation in the rule-making process.20
At the close of the hearing they, as well as the departmental
representatives, are invited by the presiding officer to submit
proposed findings of fact and supporting briefs. The presiding
officer then proceeds, without assistance from or consultation
with other employees of the Department, to prepare a report or
so-called "suggested findings of fact, conclusions, and order"
which is published in the Federal Register and a copy of which
is sent to each of the persons who appeared at the hearing. Op-
portunity is given to interested persons to file exceptions to any
matter set out in the report and to file written statements con-
cerning each of the objections taken to the action of the presid-
ing officer at the hearing. The rules of practice then provide
that the presiding officer shall transmit the record of the proceed-
ing to the Secretary, and that the Secretary, "upon the basis of
such record, and after careful consideration of the same by him,"
20. For the procedure governing food standards proceedings, see the
rules of practice published in Federal Register on Jan. 13, 1939, 4 Fed. Reg.
222, and the amendment published on July 22, 1939, 4 Fed. Reg. 3401.
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will make his findings and issue the order. Altogether, the rules
of practice governing the post-hearing procedure in food stand-
ards proceedings differ only slightly from the rules governing
such procedure in departmental proceedings of an admittedly
adversary, adjudicative character. 21 Even though the actual
practice in food standards proceedings is somewhat less formal
than the rules of practice seem to contemplate, the procedure
followed in such proceedings is considerably more formal and
elaborate than the procedure in marketing order proceedings.
Despite the fact that the procedural requirements of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are somewhat more explicit than
those of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937-
especially if account be taken of certain portions of the legisla-
tive history of the former statute,22 it is difficult to discern a
basis for any real differences in the two procedures.
Group (C): Adjudicative proceedings in which the Department
is an active participant both as advocate and adjudicator
Under this heading falls the largest number of proceedings
conducted under the five statutes selected for the Solicitor's spe-
cial study. The proceedings in this group-see the list set forth
in the footnote23-arise under twelve different statutory provi-
21. See p. 368, et seq., infra.
22. See Fuchs, The Formulation and Review of Regulations Under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1939) 6 Law and Contemp. Prob. 43.
23. Proceedings in this group are the following:(a) Under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.
(1) Proceedings to determine the claim of an individual handler
subject to a marketing order that the order is invalid as to
him or should be modified or that he should be exempted
therefrom. (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 608c(15).(b) Under the Commodity Exchange Act.
(1) Proceedings to determine whether to suspend or to revoke
the registration of a futures commission merchant or a floor
broker or to order all contract markets to refuse trading
privileges to any person (other than a contract market)
alleged to be guilty of violating the act or the regulations
thereunder, or of manipulation. (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 9.
(c) Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.(1) Proceedings to determine whether to refuse an application
to introduce into interstate commerce a new drug. (1927)
21 U. S. C. A. see. 355.
(d) Under the Packers and Stockyards Act.(1) Proceedings to determine whether to issue a cease and de-
sist order against any packer alleged to have violated or to
be violating any provision of Title II of the statute. (1939)
7 U. S. C. A. sec. 193.(2) Proceedings to determine the lawfulness of any new rates.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1940] PROCEDURES IN DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 369
sions and fall within at least four separate categories: (1) pro-
ceedings to determine whether to refuse, suspend, or revoke a
license or other authorization equivalent in its legal effect to a
license; (2) proceedings to determine whether to issue an order
to cease and desist alleged infractions of law; (3) proceedings
to determine whether to exempt an individual handler from the
terms of a marketing order issued under the Agricultural Mar-
keting Agreement Act of 1937; and (4) rate proceedings under
the Packers and Stockyards Act.
Few will quarrel with the inclusion of the license and cease
and desist order proceedings within this group. Granting the
danger in a quick application of such terms as "adjudication,"
"legislation," et cetera, in any endeavor to effectuate a sound
classification of administrative procedures, and recognizing that,
particularly with respect to proceedings relating to the licensing
power, generalization is frequently foolhardy, the license and
cease and desist order proceedings arising under the particular
statutes under discussion may nevertheless be described as "ad-
judicative."' 4 It is significant in this connection that notice and
hearing are made necessary as a part of such proceedings not
or charges filed by stockyard owners or market agencies.
(1939) 7 U. S. C. A. see. 207.
(3) Proceedings instituted by the Secretary, on his own motion,
to determine whether an existing rate, charge, regulation, or
practice of a stockyard owner or market agency, for or in
connection with the furnishing of stockyard services, is or
will be unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory. (1939) 7
U. S. C. A. see. 211.
(4) Proceedings instituted by the Secretary to determine whether
to issue a cease and desist order against a stockyard owner,
market agency, or dealer alleged to be violating the provi-
sions of sec. 213 (a). (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 213.
(5) Proceedings to determine whether to refuse applications for
licenses to live poultry dealers or handlers. (1939) 7 U. S.
C. A. sec. 218 (a).
(6) Proceedings to determine whether to suspend or to revoke
the license of a live poultry dealer or handler. (1939) 7
U. S. C. A. see. 218 (d).
(7) Proceedings to determine whether to suspend a registrant
under the provisions of the annual Department of Agricul-
ture Appropriation Act.
(e) Under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.
(1) Proceedings to determine whether to refuse a license to com-
sion merchants, dealers, or brokers. (1939) 7 U. S. C. A.
sec. 499 (d).
(2) Proceedings to determine whether to suspend or to revoke
licenses of commission merchants, dealers, or brokers. (1939)
7 U. S. C. A. secs. 499h, 499i, 499m.
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only by virtue of statutory but probably also as a matter of con-
stitutional requirements.
The proceeding to exempt an individual handler from the terms
of a marketing order issiued under the Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937 authorizes a handler who deems himself
aggrieved by a marketing order to file with the Secretary a peti-
tion stating that the order is not in accordance with law and
praying either that the order be modified or that the petitioner
be exempted therefrom. 25 The handler is entitled to an oppor-
tunity for a hearing upon the petition, following which the Sec-
retary is required to make a ruling upon the prayer of such
petition. Special statutory provision is made for review of the
Secretary's ruling by an appropriate district court, but it is ex-
pressly provided that the Secretary's ruling shall be final, "if
in accordance with law." This administrative proceeding was
devised by Congress to afford an administrative, in lieu of an
immediate judicial, remedy to a handler believing himself ag-
grieved by the terms of a marketing order, with the expected
legal consequence being that the administrative remedy must be
exhausted before the judicial process may be invoked. The ad-
judicative aspect of the proceeding is clear, being directed, among
other matters, to a determination of the legality of the marketing
order and to ascertaining the applicability of the order to the
particular handler seeking to challenge the order.
Extension of the proceedings in this group to embrace rate
proceedings under the Packers and Stockyards Act has only
doubtful basis in logic, but is attributable to two sources: (1)
the practice of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the con-
duct of similar proceedings ;26 and (2) the language of the Su-
24. The term used, in what perhaps may now be called the "orthodox"
manner, to characterize the making of decisions or determinations in a pro-
ceeding involving designated or named persons or situations. See Fuchs,
supra note 22, at 263-265, where some of the principal authorities are cited
and the term is defined with unusual frankness. Of course, any definition of
the term is to be confined to the connection in which it is offered, which,
in the present instance, is the classification of types of administrative pro-
ceedings for procedural purposes.
25. For a fuller discussion of the nature of the proceeding, see Sellers,
Administrative Procedure and Practice in the Department of Agriculture
under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (1939) 35-38,
42-46, 71-72, cited supra note 5.
26. Title III of the Packers and Stockyards Act, upon which the power
to fix rates of stockyards and stockyard agencies is based, is closely pat-
terned after the rate-fixing provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. The
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preme Court in its first opinion in the Morgan case.27 Except
for these two precedents--the one highly persuasive in practice
and the other presumably conclusive as a matter of law, rate
proceedings under the Packers and Stockyards Act, at least those
involving general rate inquiries and those to fix the rates to be
charged by market agencies and dealers (generally a numerous
group of individuals),2' would seem to be more appropriately
classified with the proceedings in group (B) previously de-
scribed. A proceeding to fix stockyard rates under the Packers
and Stockyards Act is quite similar to a proceeding to formulate
a marketing order under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937, particularly where a proceeding of the latter kind
involves the fixing of prices to be paid by handlers of milk to
producers serving a given area.21 Rate proceedings, nevertheless,
courts have frequently recognized the similarity between the two statutes.
See Sullivan v. Union Stockyards Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1928) 26 F. (2d) 60, 61;
Stafford v. Wallace (1922) 258 U. S. 495.
27. (1936) 298 U. S. 468. Note the following excerpts from the Court's
opinion, wrestling with the problem of "typing" a rate-proceeding under
the Packers and Stockyards Act:
1. "The proceedings is not one of ordinary administration, conformable
to the standards governing duties of a purely executive character."
298 U. S. at 479.
2. "It is a proceeding looking to legislative action in the fixing of rates
* * * ." 298 U. S. at 479.
3. "And, while the order is legislative and gives to the proceeding its
distinctive character * * * it is a proceeding which by virtue of the
authority conferred has special attributes." 298 U. S. at 479.
4. "That duty [to fix rates] is widely different from ordinary executive
action. It is a duty which carries with it fundamental procedural
requirements." 298 U. S. at 480.
5. A rate proceeding "has a quality resembling that of a judicial pro-
ceeding. Hence it is frequently described as a proceeding of a quasi-
Judicial character." 298 U. S. at 480.
28. The number of market agencies and dealers which has been involved
in rate proceedings under the Act to date has averaged around 50 indi-
viduals and concerns, ranging from approximately 15 to approximately 100,
depending upon the size of the market involved.
29. One difference between rate proceedings under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act and marketing order proceedings is that, in the former, each of
the "parties" is named in the order, whereas, in the latter, they are not
so named, the order being made applicable to any and all "handlers" of the
particular commodity crop covered by the order. But, except for this dif-
ference as to the manner of designating the persons to be affected by the
two proceedings, each of them operates alike upon a fairly numerous group
of individuals, so that, as a rule, both a rate order and a marketing order
have "general applicability."
One wholly superficial difference between rate orders and orders issued
in group (B) proceedings is that the former are not customarily published
in the Federal Register. Technically, if they are to be classed as regulatory
orders of "general applicability," they should be so published. But, on the
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because of notions concerning them which prevail outside the
Department, have been grouped by the Department for proce-
dural purposes with proceedings of a judicial nature.
In the main, the procedures followed by the Department in the
conduct of proceedings in this group are quite similar. The
differences, while numerous and annoying to one seeking to ac-
quire a ready knowledge of the Department's procedures, are
mostly differences in detail. Sometimes the procedural variations
result logically from the differences in the nature of the proceed-
ings. A notice of inquiry in a general rate proceeding, for exam-
ple, cannot be very specifically drawn, whereas an order to show
cause in a license revocation cause can and uniformly does con-
tain concise and detailed allegations. Frequently, the differences
have an entirely statutory origin. Thus, whether a given pro-
ceeding should be commenced upon an order to show cause or
upon a complaint or upon a petition is often the result of statu-
tory rather than administrative provision.30 Occasionally, also,
the procedural differences are based upon nothing more substan-
tial than the fact that the rules of practice in general have been
other hand, cease and desist orders issued by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion may hardly be regarded as having "general applicability"; nevertheless,
they are usually published in the Federal Register.
30. The several federal administrative statutes presently in force contain
a wide variety of differences as to procedural detail. There is no agency
connected with the Congress charged with effectuating the use of standard
terminology in the procedural provisions of the administrative statutes.
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have legislative counsel,
but, at present, the personnel of those offices is too small to handle the
numerous tasks assigned to them, and, for the more reason, it is not of
such size as to undertake the additional task of reviewing every bill per-
taining to administrative procedure which may be introduced in order to
see that the use of terminology therein fits into a scheme for standardiza-
tion. As a result of variations which exist in statutory terminology, the
administrative agencies sometimes have been dissuaded from devising more
uniform procedures, regardless of the urge to achieve that objective. Note,
for example, the obstacles of statutory language which had to be overcome
by the Department of Agriculture in framing its rules of practice under
the Packers and Stockyards Act:
Any complaint issued under section 203(a), and any notice of in-
quiry issued under section 306(e), 309(b), 309(c), 311, or 401, and
any petition filed pursuant to section 309 (a), and any order to show
cause why an application for license should not be denied * * * shall
state, briefly and clearly, the facts complained of, in the case of a
complaint or petition, or the matters concerning which the notice of
inquiry or order to show cause is issued * * * (Italics supplied.)
-How much simpler would have been the task of phrasing this rule of prac-
tice had the statute authorized all the different proceedings to be instituted
upon a complaint or some other singly described pleading.
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devised at various times by different personnel and under diverse
circumstances. Fashion and style enter into the manufacture of
procedure as well as clothes. Basically, however, a common pro-
cedure governs the proceedings in this group.
The hearing is conducted by an attorney attached to the Office
of the Solicitor, but specifically designated by the Secretary to
conduct the hearing. In such capacity, he is called, variously, an
examiner, referee, or presiding officer; and, when so serving, he
acts as the direct representative of the Secretary and not as
Government counsel.31 He is usually empowered to administer
oaths, to sign and issue subpoenas, to examine witnesses, to re-
ceive such evidence as appears to be relevant to the issues, to
require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of such accounts, records, and memoranda as
may be material to the determination, and to adjourn the hear-
ing from time to time and from place to place.
Representing the Department in the presentation of its case is
another attorney from the Office of the Solicitor, who, with the
cooperation and assistance of members of the staff of the admin-
istrative bureau interested in the proceeding, actively partici-
pates in the development of the evidence for the Government.
31. In the Department of Agriculture, there is no special unit similar
to the Trial Examiners Division of the Federal Trade Commission, or any
organization of similar description such as exists in the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and a number
of other agencies. Examiners, referees, and presiding officers who preside
over hearings in proceedings in this group are attorneys employed in the
Office of the Solicitor who, from time to time, are selected to serve as trial
examiners in particular proceedings. When not so serving, they resume
their more usual duties under the supervision of the Solicitor. In May,
1939, as an experiment in the direction of the creation of a separate trial
examiners' unit, there was established, as a separate division within the
Office of the Solicitor, a Hearing Division, composed of four attorneys who
had customarily been engaged in presiding over certain departmental hear-
ings, and headed by an attorney with extensive hearing experience and with
wide knowledge of the subject matter of the statutes under which such
hearings have arisen. Because of budgetary considerations, it was found
after this division had existed for six months that the arrangement was
not feasible. Perhaps, in any case, it could not have achieved its full pur-
pose because, despite its separation from other divisions in the Office of
the Solicitor, it was still a part of that office, and, as such, the independence
of its status would have been difficult to demonstrate outside the Depart-
ment. The Hearing Division was formally abolished on December 21, 1939;
but there is now under serious consideration a proposal to revive the organ-
ization and to attach it to the Office of the Secretary. Should the proposed
legislation referred to in note 4, supra, be enacted, the proposed rebstab-
lishment of a hearing unit would become quite probable.
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The other party or parties appear either in person or by counsel,
as they may prefer.
Almost invariably the examiner is called upon to rule on mo-
tions of one sort or another. Except with respect to motions for
continuances or to permit amendments of pleadings, which the
examiner rules on in limine, motions are generally entertained,
but are reserved for the eventual decision of the Secretary in his
-ultimate consideration of the entire record.
The hearing then proceeds in a manner similar to a trial in
a court of law, except that the strict rules of evidence are not
controlling. The testimony is reported verbatim and copies of
the transcript are made available to the private parties at a
stated cost. Cross-examination is freely permitted. The exam-
iner, within his discretion, permits oral argument during the
hearing; and provision is usually made for the filing of briefs
within a stated time after the hearing has been concluded.
Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the examiner requests the
-parties (including the Department) to file within a time stated
suggested findings of fact and a suggested order. This, of course,
is merely affording the parties an opportunity to file such papers
land is in no sense compulsory. Where a suggested-findings-and-
order practice is followed, it enables the examiner to have the
views of all parties in interest with respect to the facts and the
law at a time before he begins the preparation of his report.
'This practice, although begun less than two years ago, is now
Xniformly followed in proceedings in this group, and is dispensed
with only in disciplinary cases in which the respondent consents
to the maximum disciplinary action allowed by law. In cases of
the latter description, the examiner prepares no report.
As soon as practicable after the termination of the period
allowed for the filing of suggested findings and suggested orders,
the examiner prepares, upon the basis of the evidence received
in the hearing, a report containing his proposed findings, con-
clusion, and order, a copy of which is served upon each of the
parties, including the bureau or agency within the Department
charged with immediate responsibility for the enforcement of
the statute involved. Within a stated time after completion of
service, usually twenty days, any party who desires to except
to any matter set out in the report must file written exceptions
which, if made to a proposed finding of fact, must suggest a
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corrected finding of fact. Within the same period of time, each
party must file a brief statement in writing concerning each of
the objections taken to the action of the examiner upon which
he wishes to rely.
Immediately following the expiration of the time allowed for
the filing of exceptions, the examiner transmits to the Secretary
(or to the other officer of the Department who is to determine
the cause in the Secretary's stead)32 the record of the proceed-
ings. Such record includes: the pleadings; the transcript of the
evidence taken at the hearing; such suggested findings of fact
and suggested orders, and briefs in support thereof, as may have
been filed; the examiner's report and the exceptions to such re-
port; statements concerning an aggrieved party's objections to
the action of the examiner; and briefs filed in connection there-
with, if any. 3
If oral argument before the Secretary is permitted, it takes
place at this stage of the proceeding. Oral argument is not al-
ways allowed, however, and in no event is it permitted except
where a written request has been made before the expiration of
the time allowed for the filing of exceptions. Where an officer of
the Department other than the Secretary is to issue the final
order, oral argument is heard by such officer.
The cause is then ready for the preparation of the final order.
The Secretary (or such other officer who is to act in the Secre-
tary's stead) considers the record, consulting freely with the
examiner who presided over the hearing, and makes his deter-
mination of the issues in the cause. He advises the examiner
of his determination and instructs the examiner to prepare the
final order in accordance with his (the Secretary's) decision.
The examiner prepares the order for the approval and signature
of the Secretary. The order then is routed directly from the
32. Under the present construction of the laws now applicable to the
Department, only the Undersecretary and the Assistant Secretary may be
substituted for the Secretary in the performance of this function.
33. The record of the proceedings, as here described, indicates only the
intra-departmental record. Whether all of the items enumerated would
become a part of the record to be filed in a court, when an order is to bejudicially reviewed, is a matter reserved by the Department for determina-
tion in a particular instance, insofar as the Department may exercise its
discretion in the matter. See Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm. (C. C. A. 2, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 108, 109, holding that
the trial examiner's report was not a part of the record to be certified to
the reviewing court.
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examiner to the Secrtary, and, if approved and signed by him,
is served upon the parties in due course.
4Group (D): Adjudicative proceedings in which the Department
participates only as adjudicator
The distinction between proceedings in this group and those
in Group (C) is frequently more apparent than real, and the
assignment of a proceeding to one group rather than to another
should be made with caution. For example, a reparation pro-
ceeding, although itself involving a dispute entirely between
private parties, is sometimes consolidated for hearing purposes
with a proceeding in which the Department is an active advocate.
Such a consolidated cause may not be classified with certainty
in either group to the exclusion of the other. Reparation pro-
ceedings are authorized under both the Packers and Stockyards
Act and the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act. In either
event, they are commenced by private complaints filed with the
Department, but, before the respondent in any case is called
upon to answer a complaint, the Department conducts its own
investigation into the facts upon which the complaint was based.
If it is found that the complainant has probable cause for his
complaint, and if the respondent, after being called upon to an-
swer, fails to make a satisfactory response, the Department may
not only set the private complaint for hearing, but may, if the
results of the investigation indicate that a serious violation of
the law has occurred, issue its own disciplinary complaint against
the respondent. In that event, the two complaints are sometimes
consolidated for a hearing; and the procedure followed is that
which governs the proceedings in Group (C) above described.
This is so not because the proceeding may be classified in that
group to the exclusion of a Group (D) classification, but because
the procedure obtaining in Group (C) proceedings is such as to
satisfy all of the Group (D) requirements and, in addition, to
afford the respondent a fair hearing on so much of the contro-
versy as is being prosecuted and adjudicated by the Department.
It may happen, also, that some proceedings contemplating the
same sort of adjudication as those falling within Group (C), i. e.,
an adjudication invoking disciplinary sanctions against the re-
spondent, et cetera, will be instituted upon the complaint of a
private party and not upon that of the Secretary. In such an
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instance, the Department may take over the complaint and as-
sume an active responsibility for the development of the evidence,
but this does not necessarily follow. Where it does occur, the
proceeding loses its private character and is governed by the
Group (C) procedure heretofore described; otherwise it is con-
trolled by Group (D) procedure. Only rarely, however, does the
Department remain disinterested and stand, so to speak, on the
side-lines.
Nevertheless, the instances in which adjudicative proceedings
are conducted by the Department solely upon private complaints
and without a Department advocate appearing therein are suffi-
ciently numerous as to warrant separate procedural treatment.
In such instances, the procedure, while identical in many respects
with the procedure attending proceedings in which the Depart-
ment prosecutes and adjudicates, differs in a few important re-
spects. The Department is not represented by counsel, it makes
no attempt to introduce evidence on its own account, and it does
not participate in the cross-examination. While a large part of
the evidence consists of the testimony of the Department's in-
vestigators and employees and of material from departmental
files and records, such evidence is adduced entirely at the instance
of the private disputants and is made equally available to both
parties. The hearing concluded, the examiner, freely assisted by
other employees of the Department, prepares his report in the
form of a final order. No provision is made for the parties to
submit suggested findings; for service of copies of examiner's
report upon the parties; or for the filing of exceptions to the
report. The record, containing only the transcript of the evi-
dence, briefs filed by the parties, and the examiner's report, is
routed from the examiner to the Secretary over the desks of the
Solicitor and of officials of the bureau having immediate respon-
sibility for the administration of the statute, who initial the
report and attach such comment in the form of memoranda con-
cerning the substance of the tentative findings and order as they
deem pertinent. In his consideration of the examiner's tentative
order, the Secretary freely consults with bureau officials, none
of whom is regarded as disqualified because of previous partici-
pation in the proceeding to make suggestions as to the form or
content of the final order. In short, the hearings in such in-
stances, while they are governed by a procedure which reflects
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their character as adjudicative proceedings, do not adhere to
the far reaching implications of the Supreme Court in the
Morgan case.34 The proceeding is different in kind from the pro-
ceeding involved in that momentous decision.
Conclusion
In the field of administrative procedure, perhaps more than
in any other, the urge to standardize is strong-so strong, in-
deed, as to have prompted a large element of the legal profes-
sion and the general public to sponsor legislation which, as to
certain of the agencies, would not merely standardize but would
virtually rigidify administrative procedure. On the other hand,
there are some who, passionate in their sympathy for the ad-
ministrative process, look with suspicion upon any movement
toward procedural uniformity, and regard all steps taken in
that direction as tokens of surrender to those who oppose the
administrative process on principle. The extremists in each of
these groups are subject to the common charge that their chief
interest is not in the procedure but in the ends or the subject-
matter of administration. The activities of such persons give
an unfortunate political emphasis to much of the thinking in the
field of administrative procedure. Once this political emphasis
can be removed, or perhaps as a medium to effectuate its re-
moval, dispassionate and empirical research directed toward
classification and differentiation of procedures should be com-
menced. Ultimately, of course, the goal is not procedural classi-
fication itself, but the establishment of a system of procedures
which will satisfy alike the legitimately competing demands of
public and private interests.
Before that goal may be reached, there must be collected an
adequate body of descriptive data concerning the existing activi-
ties and procedures of the various administrative agencies and
a common terminology devised. This collection of data, to be
truly embracive, must concern itself not only with hearing prac-
tices-to which this article is devoted-but also with numerous
other administrative practices which have yet to receive the at-
tention they deserve in the process of evaluating administrative
conduct and performance. 35 When this is done, it will make
84. (1936) 298 U. S. 468; (1938) 304 U. S. 1; (1938) 304 U. S. 23.
35. The broader the range of data which will be collected, the more
elaborate will inevitably become the classifications to be adopted. To the
extent that data are considered beyond what are currently regarded as sig-
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available a broader description of administrative activity and
make possible the introduction of hitherto largely neglected cri-
teria which bear upon the adequacy of hearing procedures them-
selves.
The discussion in the foregoing pages has concerned itself
with a body of doctrine which has been developed mainly in the
language of the courts reviewing contested administrative action.
The studies upon which this article is based have adopted this
embryonic ideology and have elaborated upon, modified, and
altered it in the light of the numerous varieties of procedural
data which have been discovered. The classification suggested
herein and the doctrines upon which it rests are actually recog-
nized in the practice of the Department of Agriculture. Whether
or not it may suffice as a working classification by means of which
uniformity and simplicity in all of the regulatory procedures of
the Department may be attained without undue sacrifice of the
objectives of administration cannot yet be safely predicted. The
answer rests in the results of the research of the future.
APPENDIX
REGULATORY STATUTES ADMINISTERED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE*
1. Act of May 29, 1884, 23 Stat. 32, sees. 5 and 6, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A.
113, 115: to prevent exportation and interstate transportation of livestock
nificant in the field of administrative procedure, prevailing concepts as to
procedural classification will undergo revision. Thus, in time, the separa-
tion of powers formula used herein, i. e., legislative-judicial-administrative,
or even the use of similar but less doctrinaire terms such as "rule-making,"
"licensing," and "adjudication," currently employed in the preliminary stud-
ies of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, ulti-
mately may give way to an entirely different terminology. There may even
be a revival of interest in the work of the late Professor Freund and his
classification of administrative activities into "licensing powers," "relax-
ing or dispensing powers," "directing powers," etc. In any event, we seem
to be on the threshold of an era of classification based upon empirical re-
search. The high tide of what may be called political-constitutional con-
ceptualism has been reached in the Logan-Walter bill, now pending in
Congress. In the future, classification will and should spring from the mate-
rial of empirical research itself. This article is designed to bridge the gap
between the two modes of thinking.
* The letters inserted at the end of the description of the subject-matter
of each statute refer to the bureau or division of the Department which
administers the statute. Thus, "AAA" means Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration; "AM S" means Agricultural Marketing Service; "BAI," Bureau
of Animal Industry; "BDI," Bureau of Dairy Industry; "CEA," Com-
modity Exchange Administration; "E&PQ," Bureau of Entomology and
Plant Quarantine; "F&DA," Food and Drug Administration; "FS," Forest
Service; "SCS," Soil Conservation Service; and "SD," Sugar Division.
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and poultry known to be diseased or from an area found by the Secretary
to be "infected." BAI.
2. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 833; May 28, 1928, 45 Stat. 789, (1929)
45 U. S. C. A. 75: to provide for safe and proper transportation and hu-
mane treatment of cattle, horses, mules, asses, sheep, goats, or swine which
are exported from the ports of the United States; to authorize the Secre-
tary to examine all vessels which are to carry such animals and to pre-
scribe rules and regulations regarding accommodations which said vessels
shall provide for such animals. BAI.
3. Act of March 2, 1897, 29 Stat. 604; May 31, 1920, 41 Stat. 712, (1927)
21 U. S. C. A. sec. 41 (Tea Act): to forbid the importation of tea which
does not conform to standards fixed and established by the Secretary after
initial determination by the United States Board of Tea Experts estab-
lished therein. F&DA.
4. Act of May 9, 1902, 32 Stat. 196, (1935) 26 U. S. C. A. see. 995
(Renovated Butter Act) : to provide for the supervision of the labeling of
processed or renovated butter and the sanitary inspection of establishments
where renovated butter is made. BDI.
5. Act 6f February 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 791, sees. 1 and 2, (1927) 21 U. S.
C. A. sec. 111 et seq.: to regulate the exportation, importation and inter-
state shipment of livestock and poultry from any locality where the Sec-
retary has reason to believe that infectious animal diseases exist. BAI.
6. Act of February 1, 1905, 33 Stat. 628, (1927) 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 551
(Transfer Act and Related Statutes): to regulate the occupancy and use
of national forests and to preserve them from destruction. FS.
7. Act of March 3, 1905, 33 Stat. 1264 and 1269, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A.
sec. 123 (Animal Quarantine Act): to prevent the interstate transportation
of livestock and poultry from areas which the Secretary has quarantined
after he has determined that there are livestock or poultry therein "affected
with contagious, infectious, or communicable" diseases. BA.
8. Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 768, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A. secs. 1, 2, 3.
(Food and Drugs Act); June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, c. 675, see. 1, (1939
Supp.) 21 U. S. C. A. sec. 301 (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act):
to prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of adulterated and mis-
branded "foods, drugs, devices and cosmetics." F&DA.
9. Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 607, (1927) 16 U. S. C. A. sec. 684
(Twenty-eight Hour Law): to prohibit the confinement by common car-
riers of animals in the course of interstate transportation for a longer
period than 28 consecutive hours without unloading the same in a humane
manner into properly equipped pens for rest, water and feeding for a period
of at least five consecutive hours. BAL
10. Act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. 1260, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A. sec. 71
(Meat Inspection Act): to prevent the interstate or foreign shipment of
meat and meat food products which are unsound, unhealthful, unwholesome,
or otherwise unfit for human food by requiring such shipments to bear
marks of federal inspection and approval. BAT.
11. Act of May 23, 1908, 35 Stat. 254, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A. sec. 132
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(Dairy Products for Export Act): to prevent the exportation of dairy
products unless the same shall have been inspected and certified as to
quality, purity and grade. BDI.
12. Act of April 26, 1910, 36 Stat. 331, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sees. 125,
126 (Insecticide Act) : to prevent the manufacture, sale, or transportation
of adulterated or misbranded insecticides and fungicides. F&DA.
13. Act of August 20, 1912, 37 Stat. 315, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 154
(Plant Quarantine Act) : to regulate or prevent the importation and inter-
state shipment of plants and plant products capable of bearing plant dis-
eases and pests. E&PQ.
14. Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 833, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A. sec. 155
(Virus-Serum-Toxin Control Act): to license and supervise the production
and to regulate the importation of, and interstate commerce in, viruses,
Serums, toxins, and analogous products for use in the treatment of domes-
tic animals. BAI.
15. Act of August 11, 1916, 39 Stat. 482, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 71
(United States Grain Standards Act): to establish standards of quality
and condition for wheat, corn and other grains and, after standards have
been established, to prohibit the interstate or foreign transportation of
grains not officially inspected and graded by licensed inspectors. AMS.
16. Act of August 11, 1916, 39 Stat. 486; July 24, 1919, 41 Stat. 266;
February 23, 1923, 42 Stat. 1283; March 2, 1931, 46 Stat. 1463; (1939) 7
U. S. C. A. sees. 242 et seq. (United States Warehouse Act) : to provide for
the licensing by the Secretary of warehouses in which agricultural com-
modities are stored for shipment in interstate commerce. AMS.
17. Act of August 31, 1916, 39 Stat. 673, (1939) 15 U. S. C. A. sees. 251,
252 (Standard Container Act): to establish standards for Climax baskets,
berry boxes, and similar containers for small fruits and vegetables moving
in interstate commerce; to authorize the Secretary to prescribe tolerances
and variations and make examinations and tests for the purpose of deter-
mining whether such containers meet the requirements of the Act; and to
prohibit the manufacture, shipment, or sale of containers not conforming
to such standards. AMS.
18. Act of August 11, 1916, 39 Stat. 476, (1939) 26 U. S. C. A. sec.
1090 et seq. (Cotton Futures Act): to regulate trading in cotton futures
by levying a tax on each pound of cotton involved in any contract of sale
of cotton for future delivery upon any exchange, board of trade, or similar
institution or place of business, unless prescribed types of contract are used.
AMS.
19. Act of July 24, 1919, 41 Stat. 241, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A. sec. 96
(Horse-meat Act): to prohibit transportation in interstate or foreign com-
merce of horse-meat and horse-meat products unless such meats be plainly
and conspicuously labeled, marked, branded, or tagged "horse-meat" or
"horse-meat product," as the case may be. BAI.
20. Act of August 15, 1921, 42 Stat. 159, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 181
et seq. (Packers and Stockyards Act); August 14, 1935, 49 Stat. 648,
(1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 218 et seq. (Live Poultry Amendment): to regu-
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late the business conduct of packers and stockyards insofar as their trans-
actions are in the current of interstate commerce, and to prescribe the
rates to be charged by the owners of stockyards and by the commission
men who operate at such yards. AMS.
21. Act of August 31, 1922, 42 Stat. 833, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. see. 281:
to prohibit the importation of adult honey bees, except from countries in
which the Secretary shall determine that no diseases dangerous to honey
bees exist and then under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Agriculture. E&PQ.
22. Act of February 18, 1922, 42 Stat. 388, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 291
(Capper-Volstead Act): to promote associations of producers of agricul-
tural products for collective processing and marketing in interstate com-
merce of such products and to direct the Secretary, in event any such
association monopolizes trade so as unduly to increase the price thereof,
to order such association to cease and desist from such monopolization.
AMS.
23. Act of March 3, 1923, 42 Stat. 1435, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 91
(Naval Stores Act): to establish standards for rosin and turpentine and
to prohibit the sale of such products inferior to the official standards.
F&DA.
24. Act of March 4, 1923, 42 Stat. 1517, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 51
(United States Cotton Standards Act) : to establish standards of quality for
cotton and, once standards have been established, to prohibit the interstate
and foreign transportation of cotton not inspected and sampled by licensed
samplers. AMS.
25. Act of March 4, 1923, 42 Stat. 1486, (1927) 21 U. S. C. A. sec. 61
(Filled Milk Act) : to prohibit the manufacture and interstate transporta-
tion of any milk, cream, or skim milk containing fat, other than milk fat,
which has been added by any of the methods described in the statute.
F&DA.
26. Act of March 4, 1927, 44 Stat. 1406, (1939) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 401
(Federal Caustic Poison Act) : to require the labeling of certain specified
or corrosive substances and their preparations, and to prohibit the distribu-
tion and sale of such substances not properly labeled. F&DA.
27. Act of March 3, 1927, 44 Stat. 1355, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 491
(Produce Agency Act): to prevent the destruction or dumping, without
good and sufficient cause therefor, of farm produce received in interstate
commerce by commission merchants and others, and to require them truly
and correctly to account for all farm produce received by them. AMS.
28. Act of May 21, 1928, 45 Stat. 685, (1939) 15 U. S. C. A. sec. 257
(Standard Container Act) : to establish standards for hampers, round stave
baskets, and split baskets for fruits and vegetables mckring in interstate
or foreign commerce; to authorize the Secretary to prescribe tolerances and
variations and make examinations and tests for the purpose of determin-
ing whether such containers meet the requirements of the Act; and to pro-
hibit the manufacture, shipment, or sale of containers not conforming to
such standards. AMS.
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29. Act of June 17, 1930, 46 Stat. 689, sec. 306, (1937) 19 U. S. C. A.
sec. 1306 (Imported Meat Act): to prevent the importation of cattle or
meats from any foreign country in which the Secretary shall determine
that rinderpest or foot-and-mouth disease exists; and to prohibit the im-
portation of fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb, pork, bacon, and ham and
prepared or preserved meats of all kinds unless they are "healthful, whole-
some and fit for human food," and contain "no dye, chemical, preservative
or ingredient which renders the same unhealthy, unwholesome or unfit for
human food." BAI.
30. Act of June 10, 1930, 46 Stat. 531 (Perishable Agricultural Com-
modities Act of 1930); April 13, 1934, 48 Stat. 584; June 19, 1936, 49
Stat. 1533; August 20, 1937, 50 Stat. 725; (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 499a:
to require the licensing of commission merchants, dealers, and brokers
handling fresh fruits and vegetables in the current of interstate commerce.
AMS.
31. Act of June 10, 1933, 48 Stat. 123, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 581
(Export Apple and Pear Act) : to establish standards for apples and pears
in packages which are to be shipped to foreign countries, and to prohibit
the sale or transportation of uncertified products. AMS.
32. Act of August 23, 1935, 49 Stat. 731, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 511
(Tobacco Inspection Act): to establish standards of quality and condition
for tobacco and, after standards have been established, to prohibit the sale
at designated auction markets of tobacco not officially inspected and certi-
fied. AMS.
33. Act of August 24, 1935, 49 Stat. 781, secs. 56-60, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A.
secs. 851-855 (Anti-Hog-Cholera Serum and Hog-Cholera Virus Act): to
insure the maintenance of an adequate supply of serum and virus, and to
prevent undue and excessive fluctuation and unfair methods of competition
and unfair trade practices in the marketing thereof; to authorize the Sec-
retary to enter into marketing agreements, and to issue orders for the
regulation of the marketing of serum and virus in interstate commerce.
BAI.
34. Act of April 25, 1936, 49 Stat. 1239, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 515
(Tobacco Compact Act): to permit tobacco producing states to negotiate
compacts for the purpose of regulating the production of or commerce in
tobacco, and, under certain circumstances, to enable the Secretary to estab-
lish tobacco marketing quotas for Puerto Rico and for individual farms
therein, in accordance with the formula given in the Act. AAA.
35. Act of June 15, 1936, 49 Stat. 1491, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 1
(Commodity Exchange Act) which amended the Act of September 21, 1922,
42 Stat. 998, (1929) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 1 (Grain Futures Act): to regulate
transactions on commodity futures exchanges; and to limit or abolish short
selling, manipulation of the market, and other designated practices. CEA.
36. Act of June 3, 1937, 50 Stat. 246, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec. 601
(Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937) affirming, validating,
and re-enacting certain provisions of the Act of May 12, 1933, 48 Stat. 31,
as amended (Agricultural Adjustment Act): by the execution of marketing
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agreements and the issuance of orders, limiting or allotting the amounts of
certain agricultural commodities other than milk that may be purchased,
handled, or shipped by each handler in interstate or foreign commerce, and
by fixing the minimum prices to be paid by handlers to producers of milk,
to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for such com-
modities in interstate commerce as will give such commodities a purchasing
power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing
power of such commodities in the base period described in the Act. AAA.
37. Act of September 1, 1937, 50 Stat. 903, (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec.
1100 (Sugar Act of 1937): To regulate sugar marketings in interstate and
foreign commerce by the imposition of quotas on the continental United
States, the off-shore possessions, the Commonwealth of the Philippine Is-
lands, and foreign countries. SD.
38. Title III of the Act of July 22, 1937, 50 Stat. 525, (1939) 7 U. S.
C. A. sec. 1010 (Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act): to authorize the Sec-
retary to regulate the use and occupancy of submarginal lands and lands
not primarily suitable for cultivation acquired by, or transferred to, the
Secretary for the effectuation of the land conservation and land utilization
programs prescribed by the Act. SCS.
39. Act of February 16, 1938, 52 Stat. 31, 45 (1939) 7 U. S. C. A. sec.
1311 (Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938): in subtitle B, Title III, to
establish marketing quotas for commercial producers of tobacco, corn,
wheat, cotton, and rice whenever the Secretary finds that the total supply
of any such commodity exceeds a certain level specified in the Act; and
provided that more than one-third of the farmers subject to such quotas
and voting in a referendum do not oppose the quotas. AAA.
40. Act of August 9, 1939, 53 Stat. 1275, (1939 Supp.) 7 U. S. C. A.
see. 1551 (Federal Seed Act) : to regulate interstate and foreign commerce
in seeds; to require labeling and to prohibit misrepresentation of seeds in
interstate commerce; and to require certain standards with respect to cer-
tain imported seeds. AMS.
DISCUSSION
by JOHN B. GAGEt
Remarks of previous speakers have had to do with the Morgan
case. That case now runs so far back in history that even I
would be unable to tell you how many times it had been argued.
It looks as though it may, when finally disposed of, have been
productive of more opinions of the Supreme Court than any
other case that has come before that Court-four already, and
yet it goes on. The fact that it still stands, and that I am still of
counsel in the case, and still living after all the time that has
elapsed, leads me to say that I am a little reluctant to discuss,
- Iember of Kansas City, Missouri,.Bar.
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